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Some recent empirical research suggests that the implementation of policy reforms is 
largely dependent on domestic political economy factors. This finding is taken to 
suggest that aid and adjustment lending should only be provided to those countries 
that, on the basis of certain characteristics, are more likely to implement policy 
reform. We put these issues to scrutiny by employing a sophisticated World Bank 
dataset to explain Sub-Saharan African programme countries’ compliance record. Our 
empirical results highlight the role of a country’s income status, economic 
performance and political stability during the programme, the external economic 
environment, the size of financial support for the reform programme, and initial 
macroeconomic conditions. These results contradict the evidence underpinning the 
selectivity approach to policy-based lending and suggest that poor compliance is not 
the result of low implementation capacity and poor institutional quality alone but also 
a consequence of poor policy design. 
    
1. INTRODUCTION 
A worrying finding of evaluation studies of World Bank structural adjustment 
operations is that compliance with the policy conditions set out in the programmes is 
low. This problem is particularly severe in Sub-Saharan Africa, where, according to 
World Bank (1997), 14 out of the 37 countries in the region that took advantage of the 
structural adjustment lending facilities have a very poor compliance record.
1 Such 
unsuccessful lending entails significant costs, as these countries received $4.3 billion, 
equivalent to a third of the total lending to Sub-Saharan Africa.  
It is perhaps on the basis of this discouraging finding that it has been 
suggested that policy conditionality should be replaced by ‘selectivity.’ According to 
this approach aid and adjustment lending are only provided to those countries that, on 
the basis of certain characteristics, are more likely to implement policy reforms. The 
intellectual foundation for such a dramatic shift in the philosophy of policy-based aid 
is the research on aid effectiveness and the factors determining success or failure in 
World Bank adjustment operations (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Svensson, 
2000; World Bank, 1998).  
In particular, in an influential study, Dollar and Svensson (2000) find that 
programme success is largely dependent on some political economy factors within the 
country attempting to reform, namely, the degree of ethnic fractionalisation, 
democracy, length of tenure of the incumbent that signed the reform, and political 
stability during the implementation of the programme. By contrast, factors that reflect 
the World Bank’s efforts – such as the resources devoted to analytical work prior to 
reform, the resources devoted to preparation and supervision of adjustment loans, the 
number and the sequencing of conditions – are irrelevant for the programmes’ 
1   outcome.  
Dollar and Svensson conclude that “the role of donors is to identify reformers 
not to create them. Development agencies need to devote resources to understanding 
the political economy of different countries and to finding promising candidates for 
support. The key to successful adjustment lending is to find good candidates to 
support” (p. 896). Using the same methodological approach, Ivanova et al. (2003) 
reach broadly similar conclusions for a set of International Monetary Fund-supported 
programmes. 
Although there is a large literature analysing the effectiveness of 
conditionality which expresses the view that aid and conditionality do not have much 
effect on the recipient government’s policies (e.g. Rodrik, 1996), to our knowledge 
Dollar and Svensson and Ivanova et al. are the only two contributions containing a 
formal econometric study of compliance. Their results are stark and controversial and 
deserve in our view closer scrutiny. Although there might be questions concerning 
their econometric approach as well as their interpretation of results, we do not dwell 
on them here, since lack of access to the data set used in those papers prevents a 
replication of this work.  
Nevertheless, the World Bank (1997) has published a set of data that is 
particularly appropriate to have another look at the issues raised by Dollar and 
Svensson (2000) and Ivanova et al. (2003). We maintain that these data, though still 
imperfect, are qualitatively superior to those used by Dollar and Svensson or, though 
we will not be concerned with IMF programmes, by Ivanova et al.. These data allow a 
classification of Sub-Saharan African programme countries according to their 
compliance with adjustment lending conditionality.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
1. World Bank (1997) provides an assessment of compliance for 35 of these countries. 
2   On the basis of this country typology we attempt to identify the factors that 
empirically affect the likelihood of programme countries’ compliance. This is a 
worthwhile effort. If such factors are beyond the World Bank’s influence, the 
selectivity approach may be justified and the allocation of the Bank’s scarce resources 
can be improved by switching lending from the countries that on the basis of these 
factors are identified as less likely to comply towards those identified as potential 
compliers. On the other hand, if there are factors within the World Bank’s influence 
that affect the likelihood of compliance, the allocation of resources can be improved 
by modifying certain ‘unsuccessful’ aspects of programmes. In this case, the spotlight 
turns on the quality of policy advice. The underpinning for either position is a better 
understanding of the determinants of compliance. 
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section Two we criticize the choice of 
dependent variable in Dollar and Svensson (2000). In Section Three we discuss the 
World Bank (1997) data on compliance and the construction of the dependent variable 
used in this paper. In Section Four we present the methodology of this study. In 
Section Five we review the theory of the determinants of compliance and discuss the 
selection of explanatory variables. We present the econometric results in Section Six. 
We draw conclusions and discuss policy implications in the last section. 
 
2. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN DOLLAR AND SVENSSON 
In the main text of their article, Dollar and Svensson affirm that programme success is 
defined in terms of the stated objective of reforms. That is, their binary dependent 
variable embodies an “assessment of whether reform has taken place…has trade 
become more liberal, have enterprises actually been privatised?” (p. 897).  However, 
the appendix on the definition of variables makes it clear that there is a lot more to 
3   their dependent variable than a simple assessment of compliance. Dollar and 
Svensson explain in fact that their measure of programme success is based on 
“assessments of whether the reform design was appropriate in terms of reducing 
poverty and fostering growth in the private sector, and to what extent stated policy 
goals have been met” (p. 915). In other words, their dependent variable is a composite 
variable that is meant to reflect both the extent to which reforms have been 
implemented and the (expected?) success of reforms in reducing poverty and fostering 
growth in the private sector. We would argue that this dependent variable, when 
defined in this manner, is embracing too many aspects of adjustment lending to be 
usable in econometric work.  
While Dollar’s and Svensson’s description of the construction of the index of 
reform success has a somewhat ambiguous meaning, it is clear that there are a number 
of problems with such an index. Some are logical difficulties concerning the 
definition of the index. For example, what is the role of the assessment of the 
appropriateness of the reform design when one is interested in reform 
implementation? And why is the appropriateness of the reform design only evaluated 
with respect to poverty reduction and growth? Since reform measures differ across 
countries (for example, some reform programmes may have been specifically aimed 
at reducing inflation, while others may have been aimed at liberalising trade in an 
environment of already stabilised inflation), it is debatable that growth and poverty 
reduction should be the sole relevant yardsticks. Moreover, it is somewhat puzzling 
that the appropriateness of the design of reforms undertaken in the 1980s should be 
evaluated with respect to poverty reduction when the objective of poverty reduction 
was made explicit in structural adjustment programmes only in the 1990s. And at 
what level are poverty reduction and growth considered as adequate? 
4   There are also technical problems concerning the relative weights of the 
various components of the index of reform success. How is the assessment of the 
appropriateness of the reform design combined with the assessment of the extent to 
which stated policy goals have been met? And how is poverty reduction weighted 
against private sector’s growth?  
To summarise, we contend that the composite dependent variable that Dollar 
and Svensson have employed for their empirical analysis makes their econometric 
results uninterpretable because it measures different things at the same time. While far 
from ideal, our dependent variable, which we discuss in the next section, does not 
suffer from this problem since it captures only countries’ compliance with 
conditionality. 
 
3. DATA ON COMPLIANCE 
A major hindrance to research in this area is the unavailability of data on countries’ 
compliance with conditionality. For those who do not have access to the confidential 
databases available to World Bank staff, the only published source of data on this 
aspect is the World Bank (1997) report on adjustment lending in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In this publication, the World Bank classifies the Sub-Saharan programme countries 
according to their degree of compliance with policy conditions during their 
adjustment period. This classification is at the core of this paper.  
More precisely, for each country the World Bank has first rated compliance 
with each policy measure included in the supported programmes. Then, by averaging 
the ratings, it has produced the country index of overall compliance on the basis of 
which it has classified the programme countries as good, weak or poor compliers.  
The compliance index is however liable to criticisms from various angles. 
5   First, the technical specification of the index is arbitrary and the ranking of countries 
may not be robust (see Mosley, Subasat and Weeks, 1995, for an extensive 
discussion).
2 To account for this problem, we modify the index of compliance into a 
0-1 indicator that classifies countries as compliers or poor compliers without trying to 
precisely identify different degrees of compliance. (The country typology is reported 
in Appendix A). Moreover, we also investigate the effect on our results of excluding 
the weak compliers from the group of compliers, as these are the countries whose 
classification is potentially less precise. 
A second criticism is that the assessment of compliance may have been 
influenced by the strength of the countries’ economic performance. However, as 
already noted by Dollar and Svensson (2000), the independence of the Operations 
Evaluation Department (which is responsible for the formulation of the index) within 
the World Bank should imply that there is no systematic bias in the compliance 
ratings. 
A third line of criticism is based on the argument that the decision to lend is 
often politically motivated (Alesina and Dollar, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998). Lending may be 
granted to certain countries, despite their reluctance to undertake reforms, for a 
number of reasons: for example, to protect the continued servicing of past loans, to 
defend the institutional credibility that has been invested in previously backing those 
countries, or as a result of pressures from one or more major developed-country 
shareholders of the Bank, or even due to an internal system of incentives whereby 
World Bank staff perceive that they could enhance their careers by maintaining high 
                                                           
2. To be precise, Mosley, Subasat, and Weeks (1995) address their criticisms to the index of 
macroeconomic adjustment presented in World Bank (1994). However, since both this index and the 
compliance index are constructed according to a similar methodology, they are liable to common 
criticisms. 
 
6   levels of lending (Killick, 1996; Mosley, 1992). In these circumstances, the loan may 
be accompanied by a large number of conditions that are either easy to implement or 
already implemented – a practice that has been colourfully referred to as ‘Christmas-
lights conditionality.’
3 If this is true, critics may argue that the index of compliance 
has little information content.  
This leads us to highlight an important characteristic of the index, which 
makes it not much vulnerable to this criticism: compliance is evaluated with respect to 
whether a given reform in a certain country has truly taken place. In other words, the 
index of compliance takes full account of the fact that a programme country that is not 
serious about reforms can flout conditionality in many ways: for example, it may 
implement less important conditions while making little progress on the relevant ones; 
or it may implement the conditions but may either simultaneously introduce 
countervailing measures or reverse the reforms soon after implementation. Therefore, 
a country that receives a loan with Christmas-lights conditionality would still receive 
a poor score for compliance, not a good one.  
The need to take into account the different ways of circumventing 
conditionality has implications for the assessment of compliance. First, the index of 
compliance might have to be based on a subjective judgement rather than on a 
mechanical calculation of the fraction of conditionality implemented (Ivanova et al., 
2003, use the latter approach to construct one of their dependent variables). Second, 
compliance should conceptually be evaluated with respect to conditions and reform 
measures agreed over time in a given country rather than with respect to the 
conditions in individual loans – precisely as is done in the 1997 World Bank report on 
adjustment lending used here. Measures of compliance having the individual loan 
                                                           
3. We heard this expression at a seminar on the relationship between compliance and 
7   rather than the country as the ‘unit of account’ (as in Dollar and Svensson, and 
Ivanova et al.) could give a biased representation of true compliance. The difference 
between the two approaches can be quite substantial. For example, World Bank 
(1992) reports that Sub-Saharan African countries’ compliance with conditions in 
individual adjustment loans between 1980 and 1990 was quite high: 73% of all loan 
conditions were fully implemented and 87% were at least substantially implemented. 
This contrasts sharply with the assessment in the 1997 Report – presented in the 
opening paragraph of this paper – that about 40% of countries in the region are very 
poor compliers. 
Although conceptually superior to other measures used in the empirical 
literature, our prefered measure of compliance has the statistical drawback of 
entailing a much smaller number of observations. Thus, while the World Bank 
compliance scores are relative to 163 adjustment operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the data points are only 35, equal to the number of programme countries. Moreover, 
these data do not allow a dynamic analysis of compliance. To summarize, our overall 
view is that the World Bank (1997) data can be used in an empirical study on the 
determinants of compliance with conditionality in Sub-Saharan African programme 
countries. These data are, however, far from perfect and therefore any result should be 
taken with caution. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The econometric approach 
The problem of determining what affects programme countries’ willingness to comply 
with conditionality can be represented as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
economic performance held at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. 
8    
*
1 ii 1 i Z xu β ′ = +  (1) 
For country i, the willingness to comply Z
* is a function of a set of variables x. u1 
denotes an error term. Z
* cannot be observed directly. What can be observed – our 
dependent variable – is a binary variable that crudely separates countries into a group 
of compliers and a group of poor compliers on the basis of certain behaviour that is 
assumed to reflect the unobservable willingness to comply. Such binary variable Z is 
defined as: 
   (2) 
* 1 if and  0 otherwise
T ZZ Z Z => =
where  Z
T is the threshold to compliance. We estimate the probability function of 
compliance P(Z), that is:  () ( )
* 1
T
ii PZ PZ Z == > i by probit. The parameters of x are 
estimated such that the observed results are the most likely outcomes. 
 
The sample period 
The treatment of the sample period in this paper warrants some comments. We adopt 
a cross-sectional approach. The use of panel data is made impossible by the nature of 
the dependent variable: this is fixed and does not have time-series variation. The 
sample period for each country is divided into a pre-programme and a programme 
period, each having a five-year duration. The choice of a five-year adjustment period 
is the same as that in World Bank (1997) and it is the period over which compliance 
is measured.  
In the evaluation studies of the effectiveness of World-Bank supported 
adjustment programmes that adopt a cross-sectional approach, the definition of 
programme and pre-programme periods is the same for all countries. That is, the 
sample period is selected by identifying a specific date as the beginning of the 
9   adjustment period for all countries. For example, World Bank (1994) fixes the 
beginning of structural adjustment lending in Africa at 1986. The same procedure is 
followed in Corbo and Rojas (1992) to investigate both the determinants of 
participation in World Bank programmes and the effectiveness of these programmes, 
although they fix the beginning of the adjustment period at 1985. 
  This approach is clearly inappropriate, since African countries undertook 
structural adjustment programmes at different times, with some countries completing 
their operations before other countries had even begun theirs.
4 Thus, in this paper, the 
sample period varies in accordance with each country’s actual adjustment period. 
This treatment of the sample period is the same as in Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001). 
 
5. THE DETERMINANTS OF COMPLIANCE 
It is important that, to avoid the charge of being ad hoc, the selection of explanatory 
variables be based as closely as possible on the theory of what might determine 
compliance, particularly in view of the lack of consensus on a benchmark regression. 
However, the literature on this topic is in its infancy and proceeds in a rather informal 
way. Contributions are overwhelmingly from within the World Bank. A number of 
evaluation reports of adjustment lending address the issue of programme 
implementation (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995; World Bank, 1988; 1990; 1992; 1997). 
In addition, Dollar and Svensson (2000) formally analyse the role of political-
economy factors as well as factors under the World Bank’s direct control. Ivanova et 
al.  (2003) concentrate on IMF-supported programmes. Together, all these 
publications give an insight into the factors that might affect compliance.  
  Specifically, this literature suggests that a country’s compliance with 
                                                           
4. For example, Malawi took its first adjustment loan in 1981, Burkina Faso in 1991. 
10   conditionality will depend on its implementation capacity, the strength of the short-
run results of reforms, political stability and credibility, the occurrence of exogenous 
shocks, adequate external funding of the reform effort, the initial macroeconomic 
conditions.
5 Each of these factors can be measured in a variety of ways. In what 
follows we focus on those particular measures that empirically have given us the most 
successful regression specification. We refer the reader to Mosley, Noorbakhsh and 
Paloni (2003) for a full discussion of other conceptually similar variables that, 
however, provide inferior specifications. 
a. Implementation capacity. Jayarajah and Branson (1995) report that 
inadequate implementation capacity, particularly due to scarce technical and 
administrative resources, is especially relevant among the Sub-Saharan African 
countries in explaining poor implementation. This factor is a major constraint when 
the programme envisages reforms over a wide front simultaneously. Cross-country 
studies in the economic growth literature have also convincingly highlighted the role 
of institutional quality for a country’s performance (for example, Ritzen, Easterly and 
Woolcock, 2000). This factor is then likely to be a major determinant of a country’s 
implementation capacity and compliance. Especially in low-income countries, lack of 
infrastructure and an inadequate institutional framework may be significant obstacles 
to the response of private investment, without which structural reforms are interrupted 
or reversed. We used a broad measure of implementation capacity, represented by a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
5.  Such literature highlights the role of two further factors, namely, borrower ownership, and 
monitoring and supervision. The unavailability of data makes the inclusion of these factors unfeasible. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the operational usefulness of the concept of borrower ownership 
within the specific context of our research is rather doubtful. In fact, neither Dollar and Svensson or 
Ivanova et al. employ the concept of borrower ownership in their analyses. See Mosley, Noorbakhsh 
and Paloni (2003) for details. 
11   dummy variable taking value one for low-income countries and zero otherwise.
6
b. Short-run outcomes. A key task for a government introducing structural 
reforms is to produce good economic results relatively quickly. A favourable 
economic environment helps increase the credibility of reforms and sustain 
adjustment programmes in many ways. For example, the success of some reforms 
may remove obstacles to others and thus improve the implementation of the whole 
package, perhaps because success strengthens ownership that is essential for sustained 
implementation.  
Desirable adjustment measures are more likely to be sustained if reasonable 
economic growth is maintained (World Bank, 1988; 1990). By contrast, the private 
sector’s investment response, which is required to obtain the desired reallocations of 
resources, is unlikely to be forthcoming in an environment of economic recession and 
pessimistic expectations. Also, in an expanding economy, it is easier to generate 
resources for financing investment, government expenditure, and imports, which need 
to be maintained at certain levels to soften the costs of transition. Painful policy 
changes are likely to be more acceptable if people think the pain will not last long. 
Conversely, the failure of the programme to generate adequate and visible benefits 
quickly can render the adjustment effort socially unacceptable and, by allowing 
political opposition to consolidate, ultimately unsustainable. We took the rate of 
growth of real GDP during the adjustment period as the short-run outcome affecting 
the sustainability of reforms.
7  
c. Political stability and credibility. A relatively stable political environment 
                                                           
6. We classify as low-income those countries with per capita incomes of $480 or less in 1987, 
as in World Bank (1989). According to this, six of our programme countries are not low income. 
7. Reforms are normally associated with macroeconomic stabilisation and an improvement in 
the external accounts. However, it could be argued that, even if programmes successfully manage to 
stabilise the economy and improve the external position, they may not gain the support of the various 
12   during the tenure of the programme may be associated with a higher degree of 
compliance, since periods of political stability provide a long-range planning horizon 
for core ministries, thereby ensuring that the momentum of reform is maintained. In 
contrast, political instability shortens the time horizon of a reforming government, 
necessitating a quick success of the programme (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995; Webb 
and Shariff, 1992). If the benefits of the programme are slow to materialize, the 
commitment to sustain the reform effort may waver according to the increase in 
political uncertainty or the threat of electoral changes. Moreover, when society is 
polarized, there may be excessive gradualism in continuing with an already initiated 
reform (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Ivanova et al. (2003) highlight the role of vested 
interests in resisting reform. By weakening national ownership, they can be an 
important factor affecting the implementation of reform programmes. 
As there are a number of technical difficulties in using the standard indicators 
of political economy characteristics in this study, we have employed an economic 
variable – the change in the gross domestic investment to GDP ratio between the 
programme and the pre-programme period – to reflect political stability and 
credibility.
8
The use of this proxy may be justified by the hypothesis that the private 
sector’s investment response to policy reforms – which is crucial to their success – 
will only be forthcoming if the private sector believes that structural reforms will be 
sustained. If reforms are not believed to be sustainable or their future is uncertain, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
stakeholders in society unless they promote economic growth. Our empirical results are consistent with 
this view. 
8. Most of the standard indicators of political economy characteristics are measured either at a 
specific point in time or as decade averages and are, therefore, ill suited for our analysis where each 
country has its own sample period. Other indicators, for which yearly data are available – such as the 
Freedom House indices of political and civil liberties and democracy – are intended to provide 
comparisons across countries at a given point in time, not across time. Political economy variables are 
13   private sector will hold back investment and the reforms will be abandoned 
(Dornbusch, 1991). Expectations about the future of structural reforms will mostly 
depend on factors such as political stability, government credibility, fairness in the 
distribution of the expected costs and benefits of reforms, etc. Thus, changes in the 
investment to GDP ratio are also a reflection of those factors. In the discussion of the 
econometric results in the next section we will argue that, in the specific context of 
our regressions, the change in the investment to GDP ratio can indeed be seen as a 
good proxy for political economy factors. 
d. Exogenous shocks. Unfavourable international economic conditions may 
adversely affect the sustainability of the policy reforms initiated under structural 
adjustment. In this respect, Webb and Shariff (1992) and World Bank (1990) point 
out that loans made during the 1980s and early 1990s to countries with stable or 
improving external circumstances during the loan period had higher average rates of 
implementation than loans going to countries experiencing serious adverse shocks.  
As the Sub-Saharan African programme countries were hit by severe shocks to 
their terms of trade, especially during the 1980s, we have measured exogenous shocks 
by the change in terms of trade between the programme and the pre-programme 
periods.
9  
e. Adequate funding. Adequate external finance gives tangible evidence of 
external support for pro-reform factions within the government (World Bank, 1992). 
Moreover, it increases welfare while the programme is being implemented, thus 
improving the credibility of the reforms and raising confidence in the government’s 
                                                                                                                                                                      
also not very robust to alternative econometric specifications. Ivanova et al. (2003) for example report 
that the variables used by Dollar and Svensson (2000) do not work well in their regressions. 
9. This particular formulation has the advantage that it captures the occurrence of shocks in 
the programme period as well as the reversion to ‘normal’ values after a shock during the pre-
programme period. 
 
14   management. As argued above, a sanguine perception of the sustainability of the 
adjustment is important in stimulating the investment response. In case of adverse 
exogenous shocks, the provision of supplementary financial resources is important to 
cushion the negative effects of the shocks and allow the continuation of adjustment 
operations (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). We have used the ratio of adjustment 
lending commitments to GNP as the indicator of external funding.  
f. Initial macroeconomic conditions. In countries that have small initial 
macroeconomic problems and structural distortions the adjustment process may 
involve a relatively swift transition to a new growth path, while in countries that start 
off with more distorted economies and a position of stagnation the adjustment can be 
expected to take much longer and the implementation of adjustment programmes to 
be relatively weaker (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995; World Bank, 1988). In these 
unfavourable circumstances, the immediate objective of a programme is to achieve a 
sustainable reduction of the fiscal deficit and a competitive real exchange rate, which 
are seen as preconditions for deeper structural reforms (Webb and Shariff, 1992; 
World Bank, 1988; 1990). World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) show 
that adjustment programmes are more easily implemented and successful when the 
recipient country’s economic policies are sound before external funding is provided.
10
We have represented the state of initial macroeconomic conditions through the 
fiscal balance to GDP ratio and the change in the real exchange rate, both measured in 
the pre-programme period. These variables can also be interpreted as proxies for 
internal and external (dis)equilibria.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
10. See Tsikata (1999) and McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) for reviews of the effects of 
aid. 
15   6. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Estimation results 
The results of our probit regression for the determinants of compliance are presented 
in Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
The Kullback-Leibler R-squared is 0.70. The constant is not statistically 
significant and the likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the hypothesis that all 
coefficients (except the constant) are jointly equal to zero.
11 However, perhaps due to 
the small sample size, the standard errors for some of the estimated coefficients are 
relatively large. Nevertheless, all have the expected signs and are statistically 
different from zero at moderate confidence levels. 
The results have a sensible interpretation. The factors discussed in Section 
Five that can theoretically be expected to affect programme implementation have 
turned out to be empirically important too. Low-income countries (LIdum) have a low 
implementation capacity and are less likely to comply. The probability of compliance 
increases in a more favourable economic environment: a good growth performance of 
the domestic economy during the programme (higher GDP rate of growth gY) and 
improvements in terms of trade between the pre-adjustment and the adjustment period 
(higher dTT) are positively associated with compliance. An increase in the investment 
to GDP ratio between the programme and the pre-programme period (dIY) is another 
factor making compliance more likely. Interestingly, the fact that both GDP growth 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
11. The log-likelihood ratio test statistic is equal to 37.54. This is distributed as a Chi-square 
with 7 degrees of freedom. The critical value at the 1 percent level of significance is 18.48. 
16   and the investment ratio are significant at the same time suggests that the increase in 
the investment ratio is not simply a proxy for economic recovery and could reflect the 
influence of other factors, such as a good degree of political stability and credibility of 
the reform programme. Adequate funding – adjustment lending commitments to GNP 
ALY – increases the probability of compliance. A larger adjustment lending package 
softens the costs of adjustment and increases the chances that countries would strive 
to comply with policy conditions, perhaps also a reflection of stronger borrower 
ownership. Compliance is less likely the greater the initial macroeconomic distortions 
(i.e. the greater the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the larger the budget 
deficit in the pre-programme period – lower gRER-1 and FBY-1). This result echoes the 
finding by Burnside and Dollar (2000) that reform is more likely to be successful in 
countries with good policy environment and macroeconomic stability before the 
programme. Thus, although countries enter an adjustment programme most often in 
the wake of an economic crisis, this finding suggests that it would not be necessarily 
the case that, the more serious the crisis, the higher the degree of compliance that 
could be expected.  
 
The issue of endogeneity and reverse causality 
Though interesting, these empirical results could be biased due to endogeneity and 
reverse causality. This problem may concern three of our regressors, namely, lending 
commitments, GDP growth and investment changes. It could be argued that loans are 
more easily extended to countries that are expected to comply and, in these countries, 
economic growth and investment are higher. 
  On theoretical grounds we would expect the bias resulting from ignoring this 
problem to be not particularly large. For a start, one may note that World Bank-
17   supported adjustment operations could not be regarded but a success if countries that 
complied with World Bank conditionality grew faster, had higher investment and 
received more loans. The debate in the literature about the shortcomings of structural 
adjustment is an indication that compliance is unlikely to be the driving force behind 
growth, investment and lending decisions simultaneously. 
  Whether the expectation of compliance is a determinant of World Bank 
lending and its importance relative to that of other factors are matters on which there 
is very little empirical evidence. Moreover, some literature convincingly suggests that 
lending decisions are broadly independent of the recipients’ compliance records. For 
example, Dollar and Svensson (2000) and Collier et al. (1997) argue that 
conditionality has in practice been used as instrument to induce governments to 
reform. In this context, loan size would be adjusted, for example, according to the 
recipients’ needs, as determined by the causes of the difficulties facing the country 
and the extent of the required adjustment. The literature that we have reviewed in 
section Three highlights factors such as the importance of Bank officials’ private and 
institutional vested interests or the role of broader political considerations in 
influencing lending decisions. The very motivation for the emergence of the 
selectivity approach to policy-based lending is precisely the fact that the World Bank 
has lent to uncommitted reformers. In this respect, it should be noted that Dollar and 
Svensson (2000) treat loan size as independent of compliance in their paper. To 
summarize, our expectation – which is tested below – is that, while lending 
commitments have many determinants other than recipients’ compliance, there are 
theoretical arguments – reviewed in section 5.e. – that loan size may improve 
18   compliance.
12  
  In contrast to the case of lending decisions, there is a vast amount of empirical 
literature that shows that both economic growth and investment are affected by 
government policies. Therefore, one could suspect that compliance with 
conditionality might be a determinant of those economic outcomes. Nevertheless, 
even in this case, the bias from ignoring endogeneity and reverse causality may be 
relatively small.  
One possible argument is based on the slow speed of supply responses, 
particularly in developing countries. Structural reforms (compliance) are then likely to 
have not contemporaneous but lagged effects on growth and investment. Not only 
does it take time to implement structural reforms, there is also a significant lag before 
reforms produce effects on intermediate and final objectives. For example, trade 
reforms will take some time before they have an impact on actual trade volumes and 
patterns and an even longer time before these will affect growth. In fact, since our 
data are five-year averages, it is probable that the latter years in the sample may just 
pick up the beginning of the positive effects of compliance on the economy. It should 
also be noted that, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank loans amount to only a 
relatively small fraction of aggregate investment (Krueger, 1998). 
A second argument is based on the political economy literature. This has now 
produced a number of convincing explanations for the paradox that even reforms that 
ex post would be seen as beneficial may fail to gain popular support during 
implementation. This shortens the planning horizon of a pro-reform government and, 
                                                           
12. This does not imply that lending by itself would always improve compliance. We only 
make the weaker – and to some extent obvious – point that pro-reform governments are strengthened 
by adequate funding because funding softens the costs of adjustment and makes reforms more credible. 
 
 
19   despite the fact that over the long run reforms would raise welfare for the majority, 
reforming governments would periodically reassess the situation and wait for the 
realization of certain economic variables – such as growth and investment, for 
example – before deciding whether to continue with the reform programme. We have 
discussed the importance of positive economic results for the sustainability of reforms 
in section 5.b. and the role of political stability in section 5.c. Thus, our expectation – 
which we are going to test – is that while the short-run effects of compliance on 
growth and investment are most likely small, those of growth and investment on 
compliance can be expected to be quite large. 
  Although endogeneity and reverse causality may have biased the results 
presented in Table 1, for the reasons mentioned above we believe the bias to be 
probably small. Nevertheless, a bias is a bias and its extent should be rigorously 
investigated. An appropriate procedure suggested in the econometric literature to deal 
with the problem of endogeneity and reverse causality in a probit regression is the 
two-stage technique proposed by Heckman (1978) and Nelson and Olson (1978). If 
the true model is not represented by equation (1) above but by 
 
*
12 iii i Z xy ββ ′′ u = ++  (3) 
where the probability of country i  complying is a function not only of a set of 
exogenous variables xi but also of a set of endogenous variables yi, then the first step 
in the Heckman procedure consists in estimating the exogenous component of the 
endogenous variables, i.e. the component unaffected by compliance. Thus, one 
specifies a set of equations (one for each endogenous variable) of the form: 
  1 ii yh γ ′
i v = +  (4) 
20   where the variables hi on the RHS of the equations are not functions of compliance. 
The second stage in the procedure consists in plugging the fitted values from the 
estimation of (4) into (3), i.e.: 
 
*
12 ˆ iii i Z xy ββ ′′ u = ++  (5) 
and estimating (5) by probit. 
  To organize the discussion, it may be useful to distinguish between Bank-
based endogeneity – which concerns the lending commitment variable – and 
recipient-based endogeneity – which concerns the growth and investment variables – 
as they require different modelling criteria. In the case of Bank-based endogeneity, 
we regress the lending commitment to GNP ratio on various indicators of recipient’s 
needs as well as an indicator of broader political considerations that might affect Bank 
lending decisions. The results are reported in column (1) in appendix C.  
  Countries with larger current account deficits (lower CAY-1) and higher public 
and publicly guaranteed foreign debt service (GDSX-1) receive bigger World Bank 
loans. Greater adjustment lending is extended to countries with lower per capita 
income (YPC-1), a less developed financial system – proxied by the broad money to 
GDP ratio (MY-1) – greater dependence on foreign imports (ZY-1), greater seigniorage 
(SEY-1) – which reflects a less developed tax system and may be associated with 
higher inflation – and poorer infrastructure – proxied by the percentage of paved 
roads (ROAD). World Bank lending decisions are also significantly affected by the 
provision of IMF loans (IMFY-1), which could reflect broader political 
considerations.
13
For the case of recipient-based endogeneity, assume first that, for each 
                                                           
13. The significance of the IMF variable is unlikely to represent a country’s external 
disequilibria, since variables of external disequilibria are included in the regression and are significant. 
21   country, growth and investment (yk)  are determined as standard by the following 
functions: 
  k yp W k v α γη = ++ +  (6) 
where p is a vector of policy instruments, W is a vector of world variables and other 
exogenous variables, νk is the stochastic term, γ and η are the appropriate parameter 
vectors. Equation (6) cannot be estimated in its present form, since policies p are 
obviously affected by compliance while, as shown by equation (4), the application of 
the Heckman procedure requires the inclusion exclusively of policies unaffected by 
compliance. To resolve this problem, we posit the existence of J policy reaction 





j py yj λ ε − ⎡⎤ ∆= − + ⎣⎦  (7) 
where y
d is a vector of the desired values of target variables, λ a parameter vector and    
εj  the stochastic term. Each reaction function states that the change in a policy 
instrument j is a function of the difference between the desired values of possibly a 
number of target variables this period and their actual values last period. Solving (7) 
for all policy instruments in vector p and plugging this into (6) one obtains: 
  11 k yy p W k δ γγ η −− =− Λ Θ + Ω + + ω  (8) 
Λ is a matrix where each row contains the parameter vector λ relative to a specific 
policy instrument – from equation (7). 
d y δαγ = +Λ  and  kk k ω νγ ε = + . The desired 
values of target variables are thus included into the constant. Equation (8) shows that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Moreover, it has been argued that geo-political considerations are among the most important   
determinant of IMF lending, see Barro and Lee (2001).  
14. For meaningful results to be obtained it is a sufficient condition that the deviations in the 
reactions of instruments to targets should be random across time and across countries. Reaction 
functions like (7) have the same form as those in the so-called Modified Control Group Approach, 
which is used to assess programme effectiveness (Goldstein and P. Montiel, 1986). 
22   the outcome variables yk are a function of lagged values of policy instruments, lagged 
values of the various target variables that affect policy instruments, world variables 
and other exogenous variables. Θ and Ω are diagonal matrices with diagonal elements 
equal to one or zero, which allow the inclusion of different target variables and policy 
instruments in each equation, if significant.
15 We estimate output growth and the 
investment to GDP ratio during the adjustment period using the specification given in 
(8). The results are presented in columns (2) and (3) in appendix C.  
Output growth is positively affected by expansionary increases in government 
consumption (gGCY-1) and greater financial development (MY-1). More favourable 
terms of trade (TT-1), a lower foreign debt burden (DY-1) and stronger growth of the 
world economy (gWY) are also significant factors that improve a country’s economic 
performance. On the other hand, the occurrence of droughts (DRY) and the growth of 
non-economically active population (gNEAP) slow down output growth.  
The aggregate investment to GDP ratio rises with increases in domestic credit 
to the private sector (DCPY-1) and claims on the government and other public entities 
(CLGY-1).
16 A greater access to foreign imports (gZY-1) – perhaps a reflection of the 
dependence of domestic investment on imported intermediate inputs – raises 
investment but a larger foreign debt burden (DY-1) lowers it. The investment ratio is 
also higher in a more propitious business environment – as proxied by (the log of) the 
lagged investment ratio (LIY-1). 
The adjustment lending, output growth and investment ratio regressions give 
                                                                                                                                                                      
  
15. This is reminiscent of the Modified Control Group approach proposed by Goldstein and 
Montiel (1986) and its extended version implemented by Noorbakhsh and Paloni (1998), which nests 
the Modified Control Group as a special case when all the diagonal elements of Θ and Ω equal to one.  
16. The latter result does not require any assumption concerning the complementarity between 
government and private investment. The positive effect of higher claims on the government for 
aggregate investment simply reflects that government investment is likely to increase when such claims 
are larger. 
23   sensible results. The success of these regressions is particularly encouraging in view 
of the structure of the sample period used here, with actual adjustment and pre-
adjustment periods. The results of the probit estimation of equation (5), where the 
fitted values from these regressions replace their actual values, are reported in Table 
2.
17 Interestingly, the significance of all the explanatory variables, including those 
corrected for endogeneity, is similar to that reported in Table 1, confirming that 
endogeneity had not given rise to a large bias.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Classification performance of the model 
To evaluate the classification performance of the model, we examine the ability of our 
estimated probit regression (from Table 2) to correctly assign countries to the 
categories of compliers and non-compliers. In Table 3 the predicted numbers of 
compliers and poor compliers are set against the observed frequency of these cases. 
As can be seen from the first row of this table, the probit regression correctly predicts 
24 of the 26 cases considered: this gives an accuracy ratio of 92.3 percent.
18 This 
regression shows one ‘false positive’ (prediction of compliance when in fact there 
was poor compliance) and one ‘false negative’ (prediction of poor compliance when 
the country complied). The countries concerned are Chad and Burkina Faso, 
respectively. It may be noted that Burkina Faso has been classified by the 1997 World 
Bank Report as a weak complier: this is a point we shall return to later. 
                                                           
17. The fitted values of the change in the investment ratio between adjustment and pre-
adjustment are calculated by taking the antilog of the fitted value of the investment ratio regression and 
subtracting the investment ratio in the pre-adjustment period. 
18. Knight and Santaella (1997) argue that this measure is analogous to the R-squared in 
standard regressions.  
24    
Insert Table 3 
 
The forecasting performance of the model can also be assessed by focusing on 
the precision of forecasts. The Cut Value for Table 3 is 0.5; that is, all cases which 
have been predicted to have a value greater than 0.5 (to 1) are classified as compliers 
and all those with the predicted value of less than 0.5 (to 0) are regarded as poor 
compliers. The more these two groups are away from the mid-point and cluster at 
their respective ends the higher is the precision of the estimated model.  Figure 1 
reveals a high precision for the estimated model. All correctly predicted compliers but 
one have a probability between 0.9 and 1 while the probability of the poor compliers 
complying falls, with one exception, between 0 and 0.1. We interpret the accurate 
forecasting performance of the model as additional evidence that the estimated model 
is quite successful in explaining compliance with conditionality.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
The issue of robustness 
Given the small size of our sample it is important to address the issue of robustness of 
our econometric results. We have checked the sensitivity of our results to different 
estimation methods as well as a different sample composition. As explained in section 
Four, the probit model is based on the assumption that the error term is normally 
distributed. If, alternatively, the cumulative distribution of the error term is logistic, 
we have the logit model. Thus, we have estimated the probability function of 
25   compliance by logit regression. 
  Although the logistic distribution is similar to the normal except in the tails, 
probit and logit models may give different predictions the more the sample is 
unbalanced between compliers and non-compliers (Greene, 1997). Given the 
composition of our sample, the logit model can provide some indication of the 
robustness of our results. 
  The results of the logit regression, reported in Table 4, confirm the findings 
from the probit regression.
19  The estimated coefficients are statistically different from 
zero at levels of confidence that are similar to those of the probit regression and the 
forecasting power of the regression has an accuracy rate of 92.3 percent, classifying 
24 out of 26 cases correctly (second row in Table 3). Like in the probit model, Chad 
and Burkina Faso are misclassified. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
  An alternative method for the investigation into the determinants of 
compliance is discriminant analysis. This is widely regarded as the main competitor to 
probit and logit for classification purposes (Kennedy, 1998). In discriminant analysis, 
a linear combination of explanatory variables is used to create scores D that 
distinguish between the two groups of compliers and non-compliers:  
   (9)  01 12 2 … pp DB B X B X B X =+ + + +
The linearity of the discriminant function as an alternative to the non-linear format of 
the logit and probit models is particularly interesting, since it results in a different 
form of modelling the same set of explanatory variables. The classification results are 
26   reported in Table 3 (penultimate row) and the estimated coefficients in appendix D 
(columns 1-3). The estimated discriminant function quite successfully forecasts the 
tendency of countries to comply or not to comply with the conditions attached to their 
loans. Twenty-three countries are classified correctly: the accuracy ratio is 88.5 
percent. The three misclassified countries are: Chad (a poor complier); Ghana (a good 
complier) and Zimbabwe (a weak complier). 
 
Insert Table 5  
 
  We have also checked the robustness of our results to a different composition 
of our sample. More precisely, we have excluded the countries that the World Bank 
(1997) classifies as weak compliers from the sample and repeated discriminant 
analysis on a sample which includes only the good and the poor compliers.
20 There 
are two motivations for this experiment. One is based on the technical shortcomings 
of the index of compliance discussed in section Three, which could result in an 
arbitrary classification of countries. This problem is particularly acute with respect to 
the weak compliers, especially since so far we have included these countries in the 
group of compliers. It could be argued that some of these countries should have been 
more appropriately put together with the non-compliers. Thus, our results could be 
vitiated by the misclassification of weak compliers in the dependent variable. The 
second motivation for our experiment is that, indeed, probit, logit and discriminant 
analysis have all incorrectly predicted the group membership of some weak 
compliers. The experiment of excluding these countries from the sample is in effect 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19. In this and in subsequent analyses we have used ALYfitted, gYfitted and dIYfitted in place 
of their actual values. 
27   asking whether the variables identified as determinants of compliance are able to 
discriminate between the polarized groups of good and poor compliers, which is a 
minimum requirement if our results are to be taken seriously. 
  The classification results are reported in Table 3 (last row), estimated 
coefficients in Appendix D (columns 4-6). The accuracy of the predicting equation 
has now increased to 94.1 percent. There is only one misclassified country, namely, 
Chad and all compliers are correctly classified (including Ghana, which was 
misclassified when discriminant analysis was conducted on the full sample).
21 
Overall, we interpret the outcome of these robustness checks as supportive of our 
contention that we have identified a set of variables that affect the likelihood of 
programme countries’ compliance with conditionality and can be regarded as 
determinants of compliance. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper, which aims to explain Sub-Saharan African programme countries’ 
compliance record, has been motivated by our unease with the results of recent 
research on the factors affecting the success of policy-based lending. Our empirical 
results highlight the role of a country’s income status, economic performance and 
political stability during the programme, the external economic environment, the size 
of financial support for the reform programme, and initial macroeconomic conditions. 
  The importance of these results should not be seen only in the confirmation of 
the relevance of the many factors that the theoretical literature puts forward as 
possible determinants of compliance. This is not to deny that such confirmation is a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20. Given the size of the resulting sample, discriminant analysis is more suited for this 
experiment than probit or logit. 
28   valuable contribution. Indeed these results have implications for the design of 
conditionality. For example, the finding that good economic performance makes 
compliance more likely could entail that programmes should pay more attention to 
economic growth even in the short run so that adjustment is no longer associated with 
protracted stagnation.  
The main contribution of this paper in our view should be seen in the context 
of the debate about the selectivity approach to policy-based lending. Our empirical 
results show that a major determinant of compliance is a country’s income status, 
which could reflect a low quality of institutions. On the assumption that World Bank 
programmes can only have a very limited impact on institutional quality, this finding 
is consistent with the policy recommendation of selectivity. 
However, our empirical results strongly suggest that compliance is not 
exclusively determined by exogenous factors, which the World Bank cannot 
influence, and that the design of conditionality can play a crucial role by making the 
programme more appropriate to the prevailing conditions of individual countries. It is 
instructive to highlight some of the differences between our results and those of the 
empirical research conducted by Dollar and Svensson (2000) and Ivanova et al. 
(2003).  
Both papers find that macroeconomic conditions prior to reform do not matter 
for the successful implementation of programmes. Dollar and Svensson justify this 
result by arguing that macro policy variables in the pre-programme period (they use 
inflation and fiscal balance) may be driven by the same socio-political variables that 
affect the likelihood of programme success. Ivanova et al. suggest that the initial 
conditions could be uncorrelated with implementation because the Fund’s 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21. In the polarized sample, membership is almost equally spread between the two groups, 
29   programmes are tailored to the circumstances of each member country and the 
programme targets incorporate realistic goals.  
  In contrast with these authors we find that initial macroeconomic conditions 
affect programme implementation. Our interpretation of this finding is that, when the 
economic crisis is serious and the required adjustment large, conditions in the 
programme may have tended to make the adjustment too harsh with a consequent 
breakdown in compliance. The speed of reforms may have been too fast or reforms 
may have been sought in too many areas. We think that ours is overall a much more 
credible finding. It also draws support from other World Bank’s research. Jayarajah 
and Branson (1995), Webb and Shariff (1992), and World Bank (1998) all suggest 
that conditionality may have been too wide ranging. World Bank (1997) specifically 
mentions over-ambitiousness and inappropriate sequencing of reforms as the main 
reasons for poor programme design. 
  Dollar and Svensson emphasise the importance of ex ante political economic 
characteristics that are independent of the programme. They conclude that all donors 
should do is to “take as largely given the probability that the reform will be carried 
through” (p. 913) and identify the likely reformers. Ivanova et al. confirm Dollar’s 
and Svensson’s main message with their finding that country compliance is only 
explained by a small number of domestic political economy factors.
22 It is striking 
that, while using two-stage estimation to deal with the endogeneity of a number of 
other variables, these authors should treat their main policy variables as exogenous. 
More precisely, Dollar and Svensson and Ivanova et al. consider political instability 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with nine compliers and eight non-compliers. 
22 . In an earlier version of their paper, Ivanova et al. (2001) comment their econometric 
results with the uncompromising statement that “whether a programme succeeds or not lies entirely on 
the shoulders of country authorities” (p. 21). In the 2003 version the text has been somewhat toned 
down despite the econometric results being the same. 
 
30   during the implementation of the programme as exogenous. Ivanova et al. take the 
strength of special interests as exogenous, while at the same time citing Olson (1982, 
1993), who highlights that special interests opposing welfare-improving change arise 
endogenously in the reform process. 
  This is much more than a pure technical point. Treating government crises and 
special interests’ opposition as exogenous and then arguing that reform success is 
exclusively a function of exogenous political-economy factors within the country 
attempting to reform is what allows these authors to advocate selectivity as the 
overriding principle in policy-based lending. In our paper, the change in the 
investment ratio (which we argue represents political stability and other political 
economy factors) and the rate of economic growth during the programme turn out to 
be determinants of the decision to comply with conditionality. The simple recognition 
that these factors are affected by the short-run impact of reforms, with obvious 
consequences for their sustainability and ultimate success, immediately brings the 
design of the reform programme and the quality of the policy advice under 
investigation.  
  Our results show that the initial effects of programmes are crucial for the 
willingness to continue with the reforms and logically suggest that political stability 
or opposition to reforms may well be the product of the modality of reforms, i.e. the 
pattern of budgetary and macroeconomic adjustment, the speed of reforms, their 
extent and their sequence (Mosley, 2001). Thus, the design of adjustment programmes 
is at least as important as the identification of politically stable countries. In its reports 
on lending operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, the World Bank (1995, 1997) stresses 
the need for better design of adjustment operations, particularly with respect to 
ambitiousness and sequencing of reforms. Programme countries’ commitment to 
31   reform can only be expected when the reforms are consistent with implementation 
capacity, which implies that countries with different implementation capacity may 
require reforms with different characteristics. Particular sequencing of reforms makes 
a difference because the outcome of reforms has an effect on the capacity to persist 
with the reforms and implement new ones. 
  To conclude, the empirical results presented in this paper contradict the 
evidence underpinning the selectivity approach to policy-based lending. While in 
practice more selectivity may be required in certain cases, this should not become the 
overriding principle in policy-based lending. The economic literature has highlighted 
a number of practical problems with a rigid adoption of selectivity (IMF, 2001). There 
are also many implications both for recipients and donors which have perhaps 
received less attention, such as the fact that aid budgets may be underspent, for 
example. These are issues that deserve further investigation but fall outside the scope 
of this paper. 
Here we have focused on the determinants of policy reform implementation 
and found that some of these are not beyond the World Bank’s influence. In other 
words, there is room for improving the quality of policy advice and, with it, the 
allocation of resources. To paraphrase Dollar and Svensson, the role of donors cannot 
be reduced to only identifying reformers. Although our results are interesting and 
sensible they are tentative, as our empirical analysis has a number of limitations. We 
have a small sample, the explanatory variables are rather indirect proxies for the 
concepts that they are intended to represent and the dependent variable is an imperfect 
measure of programme implementation. Moreover, our results may be specific to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Thus, much more work needs to be done to evaluate the robustness of 
the policy implications discussed in this paper. This was but the beginning: the 
32   research agenda is long. 
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APPENDIX A: COUNTRY TYPOLOGY
† AND SAMPLE COMPOSITION 
Compliers (full sample case) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Compliers (polarized sample case) 




Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, 
Rwanda 
 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritius, Sao Tome, Somalia, 




†The group of poor compliers is the same as in World Bank (1997). The group of 
compliers includes good and weak compliers in the full sample case and only the 
good compliers in the polarized sample case. 
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APPENDIX B:  DEFINITIONS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
a)  Variables used in  compliance regressions 
 
LIdum  Dummy for low-income countries. 1: Low income; 0 otherwise. 
Original data source: World Bank, World Development Report (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
gY  Real GDP growth in the adjustment period.  
dIY    Change in the gross domestic investment to GDP ratio between the 
adjustment and the pre-adjustment periods.  
dTT  Change in barter terms of trade between the adjustment and the pre-
adjustment periods.  
The source of data for gY, dIY and dTT is: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 1997 CD. 
ALY  Adjustment lending commitments to GNP. Source: World Bank, 
“Adjustment Lending in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Update,” Report no. 
16594 (Operations Evaluation Department, Washington D.C., 1997) 
gRER-1  Growth in the real exchange rate during the pre-adjustment period. We 
have defined the exchange rate as the domestic price of foreign 
currency. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and L. 
Bouton, C. Jones, and M. Kiguel, “Macroeconomic Reforms and 
Growth in Africa: Adjustment in Africa Revisited,” (World Bank, 
Macroeconomics and Growth Division, Policy Research Department, 
Washington D.C., 1994) 
FBY-1  Fiscal balance to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period. Source: M. 
Bruno and W. Easterly, “Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 41 (1998): 3-26; and World Bank, 
African Development Indicators 
gYfitted, dIYfitted, ALYfitted are the fitted values of gY, dIY and ALY respectively, 
obtained from the regressions reported in Appendix C.  
 
b)  Variables used in other regressions only 
CAY-1   Current account balance to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
GDSX-1  Public and publicly-guaranteed foreign debt service to export ratio in 
the pre-adjustment period 
IMFY-1   Use of IMF credit to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
YPC-1   Per capita GDP in the pre-adjustment period 
MY-1   M2 to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
SEY-1   Seigniorage to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
ZY-1   Real imports to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
gZY-1   Growth in real imports to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
gGCY-1  Growth in real government consumption to GDP ratio in the pre-
adjustment period 
gNEAP  Growth in non-economically active population in the adjustment 
period 
TT-1   Barter terms of trade in the pre-adjustment period 
40   DY-1    Foreign debt to GNP ratio in the pre-adjustment period 
gWY   Growth in world real GDP in the adjustment period 
DCPY-1  Domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio in the pre-adjustment 
period 
CLGY-1  Claims on governments and other public entities to GDP ratio in the 
pre-adjustment period 
LIY   Log of gross domestic investment to GDP ratio in the adjustment 
period 
DRY   Dummy for drought. It is equal to 1 if food production per capita 
growth is less than 0; it is 0 otherwise. 
The variables have all been abstracted/computed from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, 1997 and 1998 CDs. 
ROAD   Paved road as a percentage of total, decade average in 1980s. Source: 
W. Easterly and R. Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and 
Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 1203-
1250. The data for Chad , missing in this data set, have been computed 
from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997 CD. 
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APPENDIX C: FIRST-STAGE HECKMAN PROCEDURE. ADJUSTMENT LENDING, OUTPUT 














         
CAY-1 -0.171   gGCY-1 7.244  LIY-1 0.674 
  (-5.018)**     (3.377)**   (7.734)** 
GDSX-1 12.814   MY-1 0.093  DCPY-1 0.010 
 (4.856)**     (7.332)**   (3.860)** 
IMFY-1 13.055   gNEAP  -1.940  CLGY-1 1.281 
 (3.965)**      (-10.911)**   (4.065)** 
YPC-1 -0.188E-03   TT-1 0.025  DY-1 -0.267 
 (-1.846)†      (2.620)*   (-3.558)** 
MY-1 -0.071   DY-1 -0.482  gZY-1 1.118 
 (-2.064)*     (-1.959)†    (2.486)* 
SEY-1 0.567   gWY  1.306  Constant  0.765 
 (4.520)**     (4.305)**   (3.231)** 
ZY-1 5.017   DRY  -1.676    
 (1.913)†      (-5.260)**     
ROAD  -0.098   Constant  -5.104    
 (-4.518)**     (-4.163)**     
Constant  0.388         
  (0.600)         
          
       R
2 0.841 
t-values are in parentheses. Definitions of variables and data sources are in appendix B. Due to 
departures from the normality assumption, the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator has been 
employed in both the lending commitment and the output growth regressions. For the investment ratio 
regression, a semi-logarithmic specification with the log of the investment ratio as the dependent 
variable has been used due to detected non-linearity. 
** , * , † denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ALYfitted  0.488 0.933 0.558 0.527 0.973 0.585 
dTT  0.028 0.510 0.469 0.014 0.233 0.511 
gRER-1 0.048 0.504 0.094 0.018 0.218 -0.055 
dIYfitted  0.064 0.429 0.252 0.108 0.715 0.341 
gYfitted  0.187 0.506 0.174 0.053 0.171 0.068 
FBY-1 0.102 0.426 0.017 0.120 0.525 0.154 
LIdum  -0.075 -0.029 0.367 -0.073 -0.026 0.481 
Constant  -0.641 —  — -0.546 —  — 
Definitions of variables and data sources are in appendix B. Unstandardized coefficients are the 
multipliers of the variables when they are expressed in the original units. Standardized coefficients – 
when the variables are standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 – measure the 
contribution of the variables to the discriminant score. However, the size of the coefficients is affected 
by correlations among variables. To the contrary, the structure coefficients are simply bivariate 
correlations and are not affected by the relationships among the variables. 
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TABLE 1. 
Probit regression results 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 




LIdum  -5.581 3.208 -1.740 0.082 -0.552 
gY  1.135 0.713 1.592 0.111 0.112 
dIY  0.299 0.181 1.650 0.099 0.030 
dTT  0.119 0.067 1.767 0.077 0.012 
ALY  3.327 1.596 2.084 0.037 0.329 
gRER-1 0.257 0.137 1.878 0.060 0.025 
FBY-1 0.546 0.360 1.519 0.129 0.054 
Constant  0.196 2.465 0.080 0.937 0.019 
Definitions of variables and data sources are in appendix B. The marginal probit coefficients are 
calculated at the means. 
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TABLE 2. 
Two-stage probit regression results 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 




LIdum  -6.505 3.737 -1.741 0.082 -0.480 
gYfitted  1.256 0.705 1.781 0.075 0.093 
dIYfitted  0.325 0.193 1.682 0.092 0.024 
dTT  0.103 0.055 1.888 0.059 0.008 
ALYfitted  3.739 1.634 2.289 0.022 0.276 
gRER-1 0.276 0.137 2.012 0.044 0.020 
FBY-1 0.579 0.382 1.516 0.130 0.043 
Constant  -0.247 2.915 -0.085 0.932 -0.018 
Definitions of variables and data sources are in appendix B. The marginal probit coefficients are 
calculated at the means. 
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TABLE 3.  
Accuracy of the predicting regressions. 
  Predicted Compliance  Predicted No compliance 















Probit  17  1 94.4 7  1 87.5  92.3 
Logit  17  1 94.4 7  1 87.5  92.3 
Discriminant:            
 Full  sample  16  9 94.1 7  2 77.8  88.5 
 Polarized  sample 9 1  90.0  7 0  100.0 94.1 
 

































Histogram of predicted probabilities 
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TABLE 4. 
Logit regression results 
Variable Coefficient  Standard 
error 




LIdum  -11.024  6.839 -1.612 0.107 -0.467 
gYfitted  2.153 1.312 1.641 0.101 0.091 
dIYfitted  0.556 0.356 1.563 0.118 0.024 
dTT  0.176 0.102 1.723 0.085 0.007 
ALYfitted  6.331 3.042 2.081 0.037 0.268 
gRER-1 0.472 0.256 1.840 0.066 0.020 
FBY-1 0.993 0.682 1.457 0.145 0.042 
Constant  -0.375 5.316 -0.071 0.944 -0.016 
Definitions of variables and data sources are in appendix B. The marginal logit coefficients are 
calculated at the means. 
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